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This paper analyzes a model that features frictions, an operative labor supply margin, and incomplete
markets. We first provide analytic solutions to a benchmark model that includes indivisible labor and
incomplete markets in the absence of trading frictions. We show that the steady state levels of aggregate
hours and aggregate capital stock are identical to those obtained in the economy with employment
lotteries, while individual employment and asset dynamics can be different. Second, we introduce
labor market frictions to the benchmark model. We find that the effect of the frictions on the response
of aggregate hours to a permanent tax change is highly non-linear. We also find that there is considerable
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Although labor market outcomes have always ¯gured prominently in macroeconomic anal-
yses, the way in which macroeconomists model the labor market has changed dramatically
over the last forty years. In particular, two underlying premises that bear on how to model
the labor market have become commonplace during this period: the ¯rst is that labor supply
matters for aggregate labor market outcomes, and the second is that trading frictions matter
for aggregate labor market outcomes. Interestingly, both of these views can be traced to
contributions that appeared in the Phelps (1970) volume, and each represented a radical
departure from the canonical macroeconomic model of that time period. From the household
perspective, the canonical model prevailing at the time assumed that desired hours of work
were independent of any features of the economic environment, including such factors as
wages, taxes, and transfer programs, and from the ¯rm perspective this model assumed that
employment could be costlessly and immediately increased in line with any increase in the
demand for labor.
Although these two premises are not in any sense in con°ict, almost all work on aggregate
labor market outcomes adopts one or the other but not both. This is re°ected in the fact
that the two standard frameworks for addressing issues related to the aggregate labor market
are either the one-sector growth model (extended to include an endogenous labor supply de-
cision as in Kydland and Prescott (1982)), or a version of the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides
matching model. The former abstracts from any trading frictions in the labor market, while
the latter abstracts from any labor supply considerations. One interpretation of this state
of a®airs is that each feature is important for its own particular subset of issues; in fact,
however, both frameworks are routinely used to address the same set of issues, ranging from
the nature of business cycle °uctuations to the e®ect of permanent policy changes. Moreover,
in some cases the two models deliver results that are sharply di®erent.
In view of this situation, we believe that it is important to develop a better understanding
of the relative importance of these two features for speci¯c issues of interest, and to assess
2whether there are important interactions among them. The goal of this paper is to take a ¯rst
step in this agenda. Speci¯cally, the contribution of the paper is twofold. First, we develop
a general equilibrium model that incorporates both labor market frictions and a standard
labor supply problem. Second, we use our model to address one important issue in aggregate
labor market analysis: the e®ect of tax and transfer programs on steady state hours of work.
Following the work of Prescott (2004), this issue has attracted considerable attention and
serves as a useful starting point for thinking about the relative importance of labor supply
considerations and frictions.1
The model that we develop possesses three key features: indivisible labor, frictions, and
incomplete markets. If one wants to capture trading frictions in the labor markets, then
indivisible labor is a natural assumption. While one can certainly formulate models of indi-
visible labor and trading frictions with complete markets, we believe that a market structure
that does not include either markets for employment lotteries or insurance markets for the
idiosyncratic income shocks that frictions generate is of particular interest.
Our analysis provides several interesting results. First, we provide analytic solutions to
a benchmark model that includes indivisible labor and incomplete markets in the absence
of trading frictions. We show that steady-state equilibrium allocations are identical to those
that obtain in the economy when one permits trade of employment lotteries. Our result
extends the similar ¯nding of Prescott et al. (2007) that considered continuous time, ¯nite
horizons, and no discounting.2 We also provide a complete characterization of the individual
decision rules that obtain in this equilibrium. Two interesting properties emerge. One is that
wealth e®ects are non-linear in wealth. For either low or high wealth, increases in wealth
lead to equal increases in consumption, but for intermediate levels of wealth the e®ect on
consumption is zero. In contrast, for low and high levels of wealth the e®ect of wealth on
1Ljungqvist and Sargent (2008) also consider taxes in a model with incomplete markets, frictions and
indivisible labor. But whereas we focus on how the presence of frictions matters for the e®ects of taxes, they
focus on how the presence of human capital matters.
2Also see Mulligan (2001), Ljungqvist and Sargent (2006, 2008) and Nosal and Rupert (2007) for related
analysis.
3labor supply is zero, but for intermediate levels the e®ect is positive, but only in a lifetime
sense. This last statement follows from another interesting property: current labor supply is
indeterminate for intermediate levels of wealth. Speci¯cally, equilibrium imposes structure
on the amount of labor supplied over one's lifetime but imposes very little structure on the
timing of labor supply. This indeterminacy has important implications for how individuals
respond to the presence of frictions.
Second, we ¯nd that the extent to which labor market frictions a®ect the response of
aggregate steady-state hours to permanent changes in tax and transfer programs is also
highly non-linear. Speci¯cally, in some regions of the parameter space the presence of frictions
has e®ectively no e®ect on the response, while in other regions of the parameter space the
presence of frictions leads to a dramatic reduction in the response of hours of work. But
importantly, this e®ect is not linear. For example, in the case of tax reductions, the e®ect
of frictions may only manifest itself for reductions beyond some threshold. Moreover, the
magnitude of this threshold depends very much on the initial equilibrium: starting from
some equilibria, frictions manifest themselves even for small changes. An important message
is that one cannot generally conclude that frictions do or do not matter for a speci¯c issue.
Whether they matter depends very much on what region of the parameter space one is in
and on the nature of the policy change being considered.
Third, we ¯nd that there is considerable scope for substitution between \voluntary"
and \frictional" nonemployment in some regions. Speci¯cally, an increase in frictions need
not have any e®ect on steady-state equilibrium employment. Moreover, this can be true
even though the length of nonemployment spells is completely determined by the extent of
frictions. That is, individual level data on employment spells is not necessarily informative
about the response of aggregates to changes in policy.
An outline of the paper follows. In the next section we provide some background in-
formation that helps to describe the context of the more general research issue concerning
the interaction of labor supply and frictions. This section also summarizes some related
4literature. Section 3 describes and analyzes the benchmark frictionless model that features
indivisible labor and incomplete markets. Section 4 introduces frictions into the model, and
Section 5 presents quantitative results for the e®ect of permanent tax changes and how the
e®ects depend upon frictions. Section 6 concludes and discusses directions for future research.
2 Motivation
In this section we report the results of a simple policy exercise in the context of two prototype
models that are used for thinking about aggregate employment. The ¯rst is the indivisible
labor model of Rogerson (1988), embedded into the growth model and calibrated as in Hansen
(1985). The second is the matching model of Pissarides (1985), calibrated as in Shimer (2005).
Understanding the di®erences between the two exercises serves to highlight the need for the
framework that we develop in this paper. Related to this, we argue that the results in the
existing literature are easily misinterpreted regarding the e®ect of adding trading frictions to
standard aggregate models.
At a super¯cial level, the steady-state allocations in the calibrated models of Hansen and
Shimer seem very similar. Both models feature indivisible labor and generate steady states
in which the employment rate is interior and workers move stochastically between employ-
ment and nonemployment.3 However, despite this super¯cial similarity, the two models are
fundamentally di®erent in terms of economic mechanisms. Central to understanding this is
to note the di®erences in the nature of the calibrated steady states. In the Hansen calibration
exercise, preferences are written as
1 X
t=0
¯t[logct + ®log(1 ¡ ht)]
3Although these features are similar, the models might be viewed as connecting to the data in slightly
di®erent ways|the indivisible labor model is probably best viewed as distinguishing between employment and
nonemployment, without any implications for di®erent categories of nonemployment, i.e., unemployed versus
nonparticipating. The matching model, on the other hand, also has employed and nonemployed individuals,
but the nonemployed individuals in this model seem to re°ect what the data captures as unemployed workers
rather than non-participating workers. The matching model also has predictions for one variable that the
indivisible labor model does not|the number of vacancies that are posted.
5where ct is consumption in period t, and ht 2 f0;¹ hg is time devoted to market work. The
parameter ® dictates what fraction of the population will be employed in the steady state.
If this parameter is set su±ciently low, implying that individuals do not value leisure very
much, then the steady state equilibrium will entail everyone employed. Given that in the data
the employment to population ratio is around 0:60, Hansen chose ® so that the steady-state
equilibrium matches this observation. Equivalently, in his steady-state equilibrium, workers
only want to spend roughly 60% of their lifetime in employment.





and the output of a worker-¯rm match is y. A key property of the model is that it is
linear. If one removes the frictions from this model, then the steady-state employment rate
is dictated by the relationship between the leisure parameter b and the productivity parameter
y. Speci¯cally, if b < y and there are no frictions, then everyone will work in every period.
Conversely, if b > y then no one will ever work (with or without frictions). In the knife-edge
case of b = y then everyone is always indi®erent between working and nonworking, so that if
there are no frictions the equilibrium is indeterminate. In order for his analysis to be of any
interest, Shimer necessarily calibrated his model so that b < y{in fact, he chose b = 0:4 and
y = 1{so that the di®erence is quite large. Given this choice, the frictionless version of his
model implies that everyone works all the time. In other words, he calibrates the model so
that the labor supply decision is degenerate.
This has important implications for how one interprets results from the two models. For
example, consider the case of asking what the impact would be on aggregate employment if we
instituted a permanent change in the tax on labor earnings that is used to ¯nance a lump-sum
transfer. Both models predict that this will lead to a decrease in steady-state employment,
though in general they will give di®erent answers. Speci¯cally, for the calibrations employed
by Hansen and Shimer one ¯nds that the decrease in employment is dramatically greater in
6the Hansen model. In particular, whereas a ten percentage point increase in taxes leads to
roughly a ten percent decrease in employment in Hansen's model, the decrease is only around
one percent in Shimer's model.
Because the Shimer model looks like an indivisible labor model with frictions, one might be
tempted to conclude that adding frictions reduces the impact of tax changes on employment.
But in fact, such a conclusion would be completely unwarranted, and the reason is precisely
because of the calibration issue noted above. To see why, note that if Hansen had calibrated
the value of ® so that steady-state employment is at a corner solution, equal to 1, (and
is a long way from being interior), he would ¯nd that an increase in taxes has no impact
on employment. This is because the sole channel through which employment decreases in
his model is through labor supply, and by calibrating it to e®ectively remove the labor
supply choice, the e®ect of taxes on employment disappears. In Shimer's calibrated model, in
contrast, the only mechanism through which employment changes in response to a permanent
change in taxes is via changes in the level of frictions (which in his model is captured by the
ratio of vacancies to unemployment).
To summarize, the two exercises tell us about two di®erent channels through which taxes
can a®ect employment. As a result, neither exercise can tell us how the presence of frictions
a®ects the importance of the labor supply channel, since one exercise has no frictions and
the other has no labor supply.
This discussion suggests what we ¯nd to be an open and interesting question: What are
the properties of models which feature both non-trivial labor supply decisions and search
frictions? This basically calls for a merging of the two frameworks discussed earlier, which
one can view as either adding labor supply to the matching model or adding frictions to the
indivisible labor model. One may reasonably ask whether it is important to merge these two
frameworks; one view is that the two frameworks are relevant for di®erent issues (one for
unemployment and one for participation) and that merging them is a mechanical exercise with
little expected payo® in terms of understanding substantive issues. To this we counter that
7it seems very intuitive that trading frictions would necessarily interact with the participation
decision. Moreover, our analysis shows that there are important interactions between the
two and that the nature of the interaction is very dependent upon where one is in parameter
space.
It is important to note that the issue of merging the two frameworks is not simply to add
some dimension of labor supply to a model with frictions but rather to add it in a manner
that would allow the model to be consistent with applied work on labor supply. In particular,
speci¯cations that feature utility that is linear in consumption are ultimately going to be of
little interest. Furthermore, one should not think that adding labor supply to matching mod-
els is synonymous with adding curvature. As our discussion of the Hansen model indicates,
the mere presence of curvature in preferences does not imply that an indivisible labor model
will feature a non-degenerate labor supply decision.
If one seeks to merge these two frameworks there is another issue that must be dealt with.
In particular, another di®erence of interest between the Shimer and Hansen analyses has to
do with the existence of markets for insurance. Hansen implicitly assumes that individuals
can perfectly insure against idiosyncratic income shocks associated with employment lotter-
ies. Shimer assumes no insurance markets, though of course this has no real consequences in
his framework given that preferences are linear. If one studies a model with indivisible labor,
a non-degenerate labor supply problem and trading frictions, then the market structure does
matter. In what follows we will study a market structure that does not include employent
lotteries or insurance markets for idiosyncratic income shocks. Given that trading frictions
necessarily lead to idiosyncratic °uctuations in income, it seems natural to consider a struc-
ture in which the presence of these income °uctuations is not e®ectively assumed away. If
one considers the Social Planner's problem for a model with complete insurance and trading
frictions, (e.g., Merz (1994) or Andolfatto (1996)), one can see that these models are isomor-
phic to models that exhibit aggregate adjustment costs on labor in the aggregate production
8function but no trading frictions.4 In this sense, adding complete insurance e®ectively severs
the connection between the idiosyncratic uncertainty associated with trading frictions and
labor supply. Given that we are precisely interested in the implications of trading frictions
for labor supply, it makes sense to not assume complete insurance. Moreover, there is a
growing literature that has already uncovered many interesting aspects of how labor supply
interacts with this form of market incompleteness in the absence of frictions.5
For thinking about many policy issues, this market structure is natural. For example,
if one wants to think about the e®ects of unemployment insurance programs on aggregate
labor market outcomes, then it is natural to start with a market structure that does not
already provide a full set of insurance markets. Moreover, to the extent that one thinks
that the incomplete markets structure is a better description of reality than the complete
markets model, and that market structure in°uences the nature of individual employment
and consumption paths, then a strategy of using micro data to help calibrate the key features
of the model will be more reliable in the incomplete market setting.
3 A Frictionless Benchmark Economy
As stated in the previous section, our objective is to study a class of models that features
indivisible labor, incomplete markets, and frictions. The perspective that we adopt in this
work is to ask how the addition of frictions to an indivisible-labor model with incomplete
markets a®ects the implications of the model in the context of a speci¯c issue, which we take
to be the e®ect of tax and transfer schemes on steady-state allocations. The benchmark model
for this analsysis is a version of the growth model that features indivisible labor, incomplete
markets, and no trading frictions. This section is devoted to an analysis of this benchmark.
In addition to being of interest as the natural benchmark for the question that we ask, this
analysis is also of interest for two additional reasons. First, we can obtain analytic results for
4We note that although Merz and Andolfatto both have curvature in preferences over consumption, both
models imply that the employment rate would be one if trading frictions were removed.
5Recent papers that examine labor supply in models with incomplete markets but no trading frictions
include Chang and Kim (2006, 2007), Pijoan-Mas (2006) and Domeij and Floden (2006).
9individual decision rules in the steady-state equilibrium, and the features of these decision
rules will turn out to be very important in understanding how our ¯ndings are a®ected by the
addition of frictions in the next section. Second, this benchmark model allows one to assess
the extent to which the implications of an indivisible labor model with trade in employment
lotteries are a®ected by the consideration of alternative market structures.
3.1 Environment
The environment is basically the same as the model in Hansen (1985) without shocks, ex-
cept that we consider a market structure that rules out all insurance markets and trade in
employment lotteries. Instead, following Krusell and Smith (1998), we consider a market
structure in which individuals can only hold capital as an asset. The speci¯cs of the model
follow.








where ct ¸ 0 is consumption in period t and ht 2 f0;1g is hours devoted to market work
in period t. Given that labor is assumed to be indivisible we need only assume that d is
increasing. We normalize d(0) to be equal to 0 and let d(1) = D. The discount factor ¯
satis¯es 0 < ¯ < 1.
There is an aggregate production function that uses capital (Kt) and labor (Ht) to produce




Aggregate labor input is simply the integral of individual labor supply across households.
Output can be used either as consumption or investment, investment is reversible, and capital
depreciates at rate ±, with 0 < ± < 1.
We assume that the government levies a constant proportional tax ¿ on labor earnings
and that the tax revenues are used to ¯nance an equal lump-sum transfer payment Tt to all
10individuals subject to a period-by-period balanced budget condition:
Tt = ¿wtHt;
where wt is the wage rate at time t.
We consider a recursive representation of the competitive equilibrium. In a steady-state
equilibrium, prices for both capital and labor services will be constant, and we denote them
by r and w respectively. As noted above, we assume that the capital stock is the only asset.
We can additionally allow the consumers to borrow and lend using one period bonds in zero
net supply, subject to a borrowing limit. In such a case, it is easy to show that the return
on holding bonds must be equal to the return on holding capital, so that the net return on
bonds in steady state is the same as that on capital. In the following, we impose a borrowing
constraint at zero; i.e., that the net asset holdings for an individual cannot be negative.
We show in the appendix (Proposition 2) that in the steady-state equilibrium of this
model, prices and the aggregate allocation are identical to those that obtain in the model
that includes markets for lotteries (i.e., insurance markets for idiosyncratic risk). In this
sense, the lack of complete markets in this setting has no aggregate implications. It follows
that the aggregate e®ects of tax and transfer schemes in this model are identical to those
in the complete markets model, and are therefore well understood.6 However, it turns out
that understanding the nature of individual decision rules in this context is very important
to understanding how the addition of frictions will a®ect aggregate outcomes, and so in the
next subsection we explore the properties of steady-state equilibrium decision rules. A nice
feature of this model is that we can obtain a full analytic characterization of the steady-state
decision rules.
3.2 Decision Rules in the Steady-State Equilibrium
If r is the rental rate on capital, then the e®ective real rate of return on assets is 1 + r ¡ ±.
The only individual state variable for a household is the level of assets that they have at the
6Although the aggregate behavior of the incomplete-market economies is the same as that of the complete-
market economy, the individual behavior of employment and asset dynamics may look very di®erent.
11beginning of the period, which we denote by a. The dynamic programming problem for a
household is then given by:
V (a) = maxf max
a0 log
¡
(1 + r ¡ ±)a + (1 ¡ ¿)w + T ¡ a0¢




(1 + r ¡ ±)a + T ¡ a0¢
¡ d(0) + ¯V (a0) g
subject to
a0 ¸ 0:
Given that preferences are assumed to be separable between consumption and leisure, the
Euler equation for this problem is
1
c
= ¯(1 + r ¡ ±)
1
c0;
and is independent of the labor/leisure decision, where c0 is next period's consumption. Thus,
for aggregate consumption to be constant, it is necessary that 1+r¡± = 1=¯. In what follows
we will replace 1 + r ¡ ± by 1=¯.
We further assume that ¯ > 1=2. Proposition 1, which is stated formally and proven
in the appendix, characterizes the value function and decision rules for the above problem.
Here we focus on a diagrammatic representation of the results and some intuition. As noted,
this is of signi¯cant interest since an understanding of the decision rules in the frictionless
context will be very useful in understanding how the introduction of frictions in the next
section in°uences decision rules.
Figures 1, 2, and 3 depict the decision rules for the work-leisure choice, the asset choice,
and consumption.
Intuitively, we can interpret the result as three di®erent types of behavior, depending on
the level of wealth, with two \bu®er zones" in between. When the wealth level is very low
(a · a: \work" region), the consumer always works, and the asset level remains constant
over time. In this region, a higher wealth level means a higher level of consumption. In
contrast, when the wealth level is very high (a ¸ ¹ a: \leisure" region), the consumer never
works, but the asset level again remains constant over time. As in the previous case, a higher
12Figure 1: Decision rules for work-leisure choice
Figure 2: Decision rules for asset choice
13Figure 3: Decision rules for consumption
wealth level means a higher consumption. A worker who starts in either of these two regions
of wealth will have the same values for h, a, and c forever. It also follows that each of these
regions are absorbing states, in that once in either of these regions, an individual will forever
remain in them.
Next we consider the case in which the wealth level is intermediate (a 2 [a¤;a¤]: \indif-
ference" region). In this region the consumer is indi®erent between working and not working
in the current period. In general, the consumer will move between periods of work and peri-
ods of leisure, but consumption remains constant independently of the current work decision.
During a period of work, the consumer accumulates assets, and during a period of leisure, the
consumer runs them down. In this region, the consumption level is constant across di®erent
wealth levels, but the wealth level changes over time. Many di®erent dynamic work/leisure
patterns for the consumer are possible, though this will be clearer once we discuss the role
of the \bu®er zones."
Between the \work" region and the \indi®erence" region and between the \indi®erence"
14region and the \leisure" region, there are \bu®er zones." Starting from these zones, the asset
level always moves towards the \indi®erence" region. Workers who start with wealth levels
in the \indi®erence" region can enter these bu®er zones, but they are always brought back to
the \indi®erence" region. They will never leave the interval consisting of the \indi®erence"
region and the two bu®er zones, so that the region (a;¹ a) is also an absorbing state. In the
bu®er zones, the consumption level is the same as in the \indi®erence" region. Although
the labor decision is not determined inside the region of indi®erence, if a given household
were to repeatedly choose to not work (or work), then they would eventually transit to
the bu®er zone that lies below (above) the indi®erence region, and at this point the labor
supply decision becomes determinate until they once again enter the indi®erence region. It
follows that the equilibrium places some discipline on the number of consecutive periods of
employment or non-employment, but apart from this places relatively few restrictions on the
nature of individual employment histories.
It is of interest to consider the issue of how large the various regions are, and how
they respond to changes in various parameters. One can show that if ¯ tends to one, the
relative size of the bu®er zones (compared to the size of the indi®erence zone) tends to
zero. This ¯nding is intuitive. In a continuous time model the bu®er zones would not exist;
instead we would simply have re°ecting barriers on either end of the indi®erence region. One
interpretation of the case where ¯ tends to one is that we are making each period very very
short, and hence we approach the continuous time result.
Although we will not pursue the issue further here, we think it is interesting to note that
the above characterization has some interesting implications for empirical work that seeks
to uncover various labor supply elasticities. Speci¯cally, the fact that current labor supply
does not respond to an increase or decrease in wealth is potentially not at all informative
regarding the overall e®ect on labor supply. The associated changes in labor supply may
occur in the future instead of contemporaneously. Another interesting implication of the
above characterization is that a wealth transfer has very di®erent e®ects on consumption,
15depending on the initial level of wealth. When the wealth level is very low or very high, a
(small) transfer in wealth increases the worker's consumption level, but has no impact on
hours of work. However, the consumption level is una®ected by a (small) transfer if the
wealth level is in the \indi®erence" region. There, an increase in wealth is perfectly absorbed
by an increase in leisure time, though as just noted, not necessarily contemporaneously. In
other words, there is no wealth e®ect on consumption in this region. Similarly, the e®ects of
a wealth transfer on labor supply is also very dependent on the initial wealth holdings and
can be very non-linear in the amount of the transfer. For example, a positive wealth transfer
can push a household from the region of always working to the indi®erence region, but for
smaller wealth transfer there might not be any e®ect.
It is also of interest to look ahead slightly and anticipate how the addition of frictions
will in°uence decision rules. Of particular interest is the indi®erence region. The key feature
of decision rules in this region is that the individual is indi®erent between working and
not working in any given period. Depending upon the size of the indi®erence region, this
indi®erence applies not only for the current period, but also for some number of periods in
the future as well. Intuitively, depending upon the size of frictions relative to the indi®erence
region, frictions may not matter much at all for such an individual. Frictions imply that
it might take several periods for an individual to ¯nd a job even after they have decided
that they would like to work. But if the time it takes to ¯nd a job is small relative to the
number of periods over which they are indi®erent between working and not working, then the
friction will have little e®ect. Conversely, in order for frictions to matter to the individual,
the frictions must be large relative to the size of the indi®erence region.
4 Frictions in the Benchmark Economy
We now introduce frictions to the labor market. Our approach to modeling frictions is in
the spirit of the island model of Lucas and Prescott (1974), though our environment di®ers
from theirs in some respects. In particular, we will assume that there are two islands, one of
16which we call the \production island," and the other of which we will call the \leisure island."
The production island is endowed with an aggregate production function that is the same
as that considered in the benchmark model in the previous section. We introduce frictions
by assuming that workers cannot freely move between the two islands. In particular, if a
worker supplies labor in period t (i.e., resides on the production island in period t), then with
probability ¾ he or she will begin the next period on the leisure island, and with probability
1 ¡ ¾ will begin the next period on the production island. At the beginning of period t + 1,
any individual who either did not supply labor in period t (i.e., lived on the leisure island in
period t) or was sent to the leisure island at the end of period t, will be sent to the production
island with probability ¸w. These workers, plus any workers who resided on the production
island in period t and were not sent to the leisure island, all have the opportunity to supply
labor in period t + 1. All other workers do not have the opportunity to supply labor in
period t + 1. Loosely speaking, ¾ is the exogenous separation rate, and ¸w is the exogenous
job arrival rate. Note that given this formulation, the frictionless model in the previous
section corresponds to the case with ¸w = 1, since if all workers always have a job o®er,
then separations are irrelevant.7 The key feature of this economy relative to the benchmark
model is that workers do not always have the opportunity to work. This manifests itself in
two di®erent ways. First, if an individual chooses to not work in period t, then it is not
certain that he or she will have the opportunity to work in period t + 1. Second, even if an
individual works in period t, he or she is not guaranteed an opportunity to work in period
t + 1.
Once again we will focus on a steady-state equilibrium. We assume the same market
structure as before, i.e., markets for output, labor and capital services in each period, in
addition to a one-period bond. We again denote steady-state values for the wage and rental
7In contrast to standard matching models in which the frictions are endogenously determined, we assume
them to be exogenous. While our analysis can assess the extent to which the presence of frictions in°uences
the e®ect of tax changes, it does not directly assess the extent to which the answer might be a®ected by
allowing frictions to also change in response to the change in taxes. Nonetheless, our results do suggest when
this latter e®ect might be important.
17rate for capital services as w and r. A worker's state consists of his or her location at the time
that the labor supply decision needs to be made, and the level of asset holdings. Let the value
function for a worker in a productive island be W(a), the value function for a worker who
begins the period on the leisure island but before the job o®er realization be S(a), and the
value function for a worker who does not work for the current period (nonemployed worker)
be N(a). Then, the Bellman equation for an individual who has the opportunity to work
and chooses to work is:
W(a) = max
c;a0 log(c) ¡ d(1) + ¯E[¾S(a0) + (1 ¡ ¾)maxfW(a0);N(a0)g]
subject to
a0 = (1 + r ¡ ±)a + (1 ¡ ¿)w + T ¡ c
and
a0 ¸ 0:
The worker who begins a period on the leisure island has the Bellman equation given by:
S(a) = ¸w maxfW(a);N(a)g + (1 ¡ ¸w)N(a):
And an individual who does not work, either because he or she did not have the opportunity
or chose not to, has a Bellman equation given by:
N(a) = max
c;a0 log(c) ¡ d(0) + ¯S(a0)
subject to
a0 = (1 + r ¡ ±)a + T ¡ c
and
a0 ¸ 0:
The ¯rm and the government problems are formulated the same way as in the previous
section, so we do not repeat them here.
18The economy with frictions does not permit as sharp an analytical characterization as
was possible for the frictionless model. However, some properties can be established. For
example, the decision rule for whether to work has a reservation property with regard to
asset holdings. In particular, if it is not optimal for a worker with asset holdings a to work,
then any individual with assets greater than a will also ¯nd it not optimal to work. Similarly,
if an individual with asset holdings a ¯nds it optimal to work, then any individual with asset
holdings less than a will choose to work given the opportunity.
Note that adding frictions to the model serves to break the indeterminacy result that
we found for the frictionless model. There we found a region of asset holdings for which
the individual was indi®erent regarding current labor supply, but with frictions this region
shrinks to a single point. An important quantitative issue is that there may still be a region
in which the individual is very close to indi®erence, so that even when the individual strictly
prefers to work this period, it may not matter much to them.8
In contrast to the frictionless model, it will not be that the case that 1=¯ = 1+r¡± in the
steady-state equilibrium. The presence of frictions implies that individuals face idiosyncratic
income risk, and as is standard in models with idiosyncratic income risk and incomplete
markets, we will have greater accumulation of capital.
5 Implications of Frictions: Quantitative Results
In this section we analyze how labor market frictions impact the answer to a simple tax
experiment. Speci¯cally, we consider tax policies of the form described earlier, in which the
government levies a constant proportional tax on labor earnings and uses the proceeds to
fund a uniform lump-sum transfer to all individuals, subject to a period-by-period balanced
budget rule. We examine how the presence of frictions a®ects the response to a tax changes
of a given magnitude.
8Idiosyncratic variation in either productivity or preferences can also serve to break the indi®erence in the
frictionless model. Rogerson and Wallenius (2007) use age varying productivity or disutility from working
to generate determinate labor supply patterns over the lifecycle. Chang and Kim (2006) use idiosyncratic
productivity shocks to generate determinate labor supply patterns.
195.1 Calibration
In this subsection we describe how we calibrate the model. We will consider di®erent levels
of frictions, but for our benchmark calibration we will also calibrate the parameters that
characterize the frictions. We set the period length equal to one month. Many of the
parameters can be calibrated using standard methods. Speci¯cally, we choose values for
¯, ®, and ± so as to match three targets: a capital share of 0:3, an investment to output
ratio of 0:2, and a 4% annual rate of return to capital. This gives ¯ = 0:9967, ® = 0:3
and ± = 0:0067. We set ¿ = 0:30 as the tax rate, consistent with measured values of the
current average e®ective tax rate on labor income for the US. For the two parameters that
capture the extent of frictions we set ¸w = 0:2 and ¾ = 0:02. These values are consistent
with the transition probabilities between unemployment and employment in the CPS data.9
We normalize d(0) = 0 and set d(1) = ¡2:3 £ log(1 ¡ 1=3). From these, we obtain that 66%
of the population is working in the steady-state of the benchmark, which is similar to the
employment to population ratio in the United States.
As noted above, we will also consider economies with di®erent levels of frictions in order
to assess the importance of frictions for the answer to a speci¯c policy question. Speci¯cally,
we will consider various values of ¸w, holding ¾ constant. In these economies with di®erent
values of ¸w we recalibrate all of the other parameters of the model so as to match the same
aggregate targets, i.e., capital's share of income, the investment to output ratio, the real rate
of return to capital, and the employment rate.
One of the economies that we study is the frictionless benchmark economy. When consid-
ering the frictionless model we assume that all the workers start from the wealth level in the
\indi®erence" region. As noted earlier, there is a large indeterminacy in the decision rules of
the workers in the \indi®erence" region. However, in the presence of frictions this indeter-
9See Hobijn and S »ahin (2007, Table 3). They report that the transition rate from unemployment to
employment is on average 20 percent for 1976-2005. Consistent with this, we set ¸w = 0:2 for our benchmark
calibration. Hobijn and S »ahin also report that employment to unemployment transition rate is on average
1.6 percent for the same sample period. Since ¸w = 0:2 fraction of unemployed workers ¯nd jobs in the same
period, we set ¾ = 0:02 which is consistent with a transition rate of 1.6 percent.
20K=H
¸w = 1:0 128:7
¸w = 0:3 128:7
¸w = 0:2 129:0
¸w = 0:1 131:8
Table 1: Capital-labor ratio
minacy does not exist{instead there are reservation asset levels. If we want to think of the
frictionless economy as the limit of the economy with frictions as the level of frictions tend
to zero then it seems reasonable to focus on decision rules for the frictionless economy which
also impose a reservation asset rule, and so we do this when solving for the equilibrium of the
frictionless model. We let the threshold asset holdings be denoted by ~ a: work when a · ~ a
and take leisure when a > ~ a. Although there are many values of ~ a that are consistent with
optimal decision rules, there is only one choice of ~ a that is consistent with the steady-state
aggregate values of K and H. It is typically the case that K is increasing in ~ a, so ~ a can be
pinned down by the aggregate value of K.
We consider four values for ¸w: 1:0 (no frictions), 0:3, 0:2, and 0:1. Although the targets
used in the calibration are the same across all economies, the economies do di®er along some
dimensions that are not targeted. Table 1 shows the values of capital-labor ratio K=H for
the various calibrated economies.
Given that aggregate employment is the same across all four economies, these di®erences
re°ect di®erences in capital accumulation. Note that this value is the same for ¸w = 1:0
and ¸w = 0:3, but that it increases as ¸w is decreased further. Given the literature on
precautionary savings (see e.g., Huggett (1993) and Aiyagari (1994)), it is intuitive that
K=H increases as frictions increase, since greater frictions lead to greater uncertainty in the
individual income process, and therefore additional precautionary savings. What the table
tells us is that this e®ect only becomes quantitatively noticeable when frictions are quite
large, since even when ¸w = 0:3 the amount of capital accumulated is e®ectively identical to
21Equilibrium Frictional Nonemployment Only
Employment Nonemployment Employment Nonemployment
¸w = 1:0 1:9 1:0 ¡ ¡
¸w = 0:3 6:4 3:3 71:4 3:3
¸w = 0:2 9:6 5:0 62:5 5:0
¸w = 0:1 19:1 10:0 55:6 10:0
Table 2: Average duration of employment and nonemployment
that in the frictionless economy. Key to this result is the fact that in our calibrated economy,
individuals only want to work roughly two thirds of the time. This makes it easy for the
individuals to accommodate some frictional nonemployment. For example, if an individual
in the frictionless economy were simply told that he or she would not be allowed to work
every tenth period, this would have no e®ect on his or her accumulation of assets.
It is also of interest to examine how individual employment histories vary with the extent
of frictions. Table 2 presents the average duration of employment and nonemployment spells
in steady-state equilibrium for the four di®erent economies.
The ¯nal two columns report the duration of employment and nonemployment spells that
would result if there were only frictional nonemployment. Interestingly, the average duration
of nonemployment spells in all of the economies with frictions is exactly that which would
emerge if all nonemployment were frictional. It follows that individuals in these economies
e®ectively never turn down an employment opportunity. To understand this result, note that
any individual who has spent one period not working must necessarily have asset holdings
below the reservation asset level. If they are nonemployed because of job loss, then their
assets at the time of job loss must have been below the reservation level, and spending
one period without working will have reduced them further. If, on the other hand, they
became nonemployed by choice, by virtue of having spent a period in unemployment they
will necessarily have reduced their asset holdings.10 Because the steady-state employment
10Of course, a worker who su®ered a job loss at the end of period t but who would have chosen not to work
in period t + 1 will not accept a job opportunity in period t + 1 even if o®ered.
22rate is above 0:5, it must be that one period of unemployment necessarily pushes their assets
below the reservation level. It follows that no-one who has spent one period unemployed ever
turns down a job opportunity. One might conjecture that if individuals never turn down job
o®ers, then employment must be determined by the frictions. However, this table shows that
employment spells are much shorter than those that would obtain in an economy in which
nonemployment were only due to frictions. In other words, labor supply considerations are
very much at work in equilibrium even though all unemployed workers will always accept an
o®er to work.
The table also shows that a key impact of frictions is to change the nature of individ-
ual employment histories. In particular, as frictions increase, the average duration of both
employment and nonemployment spells increase. Average employment durations respond to
changes in ¸w even though the probability of job loss is constant across these economies. The
reason for this is that when ¸w is low, a worker knows that if they choose not to work today,
it may be several periods before they get another opportunity to work. Since they need to
have su±cient assets to provide for consumption during this nonemployment spell, they need
to work longer to accumulate more assets before choosing to not work in an economy with
low ¸w.
It is also of interest to examine the di®erence in asset distributions across the four
economies. This is done in Figures 4 and 5.
As one might expect from the previous intuition, as frictions increase, the asset distribu-
tions become more spread out.
5.2 Results
In this subsection we report the e®ects of changes in taxes on steady-state allocations for the
four economies that di®er in the extent of frictions.
We begin by examining the e®ects on aggregate employment. Table 3 presents the results.
Recall that the calibration set ¿ = 0:30, so that by construction, employment is the same for
all four economies for this value of the tax rate.























Figure 4: Wealth distributions for employed workers, ¿ = 0:30























Figure 5: Wealth distributions for nonemployed workers,¿ = 0:30
24¿ = 0:00 ¿ = 0:15 ¿ = 0:30 ¿ = 0:45 ¹ n
¸w = 1:0 0:99 0:80 0:66 0:52 0:00
¸w = 0:3 0:92 0:80 0:66 0:52 0:03
¸w = 0:2 0:91 0:80 0:66 0:52 0:07
¸w = 0:1 0:85 0:79 0:66 0:52 0:15
Table 3: Aggregate employment H
The table reveals a striking asymmetry. If taxes are increases from 0:30 to 0:45, then the
e®ect on aggregate employment is independent of the level of frictions in the economy: in
all cases the employment rate drops from 0:66 to 0:52, implying a decrease in hours worked
of over 20%. Similarly, if taxes were reduced to 0:15, then the employment rate increases
in all cases, and the increase is virtually identical across the four economies. However, if
taxes were reduced to 0, then the increase in employment varies quite substantially across
the economies, with the increase in employment being a decreasing function of the level of
frictions. For example, when taxes are reduced from 0:15 to 0:00, the increase in aggregate
hours is almost 25% when ¸w = 1:0, but less than 8% when ¸w = 0:1.
To understand these results it is instructive to note that if all consumers choose to work
whenever they have the opportunity (i.e., there is frictional nonemployment only), then the
nonemployment rate evolves according to:
nt+1 = (1 ¡ ¸w)nt + ¾(1 ¡ ¸w)(1 ¡ nt):
Note in this expression that a worker who separates at the end of period t will not necessarily
be nonemployed in period t + 1, since they will still have probability ¸w of obtaining the
opportunity to work in period t + 1. The above expression implies that at the steady state:
¹ n =
¾(1 ¡ ¸w)
¾(1 ¡ ¸w) + ¸w
:
This value is reported in the the last column in Table 3. Looking at the numbers in the ¯nal
column, the following pattern emerges. As long as actual nonemployment is not too close to
frictional nonemployment, then the level of frictions is e®ectively irrelevant for the response
25of aggregate employment to changes in taxes. But as the two values become closer, frictions
start to have an e®ect. Interestingly, however, it is not the case that frictions matter only
if the frictions bind in terms of the maximal steady-state employment rate. For example,
consider a reduction of ¿ from 0:15 to 0:00 in the ¸w = 1:0 and ¸w = 0:3 economies. When
¿ = 0:15, both economies have employment rates of 0:80. As taxes are decreased from 0:15
to 0:00, the frictionless economy has employment increase from 0:80 to 0:99. The maximal
steady-state employment rate in the ¸w = 0:3 economy is 0:97. But the employment rate in
the ¸w = 0:3 increases only to 0:92 when taxes drop to 0:00, substantially below the maximal
level dictated by the frictions. Note that whether we are considering raising taxes from 0:00
to 0:15 or lowering taxes from 0:15 to 0:00, the elasticity of employment with regard to taxes
is less in the ¸w = 0:3 economy than in the ¸w = 1:0 economy.
To summarize, a key implication of these results is that in economies where individuals
do not desire to work in every period, there is the scope for a great deal of substitution
between frictional nonemployment and voluntary nonemployment. In this case the level of
frictions are not very relevant for how the economy responds to permanent tax changes. If
however, the level of nonemployment approaches that of frictional nonemployment, then the
level of frictions matter, and in particular, responses to permanent tax changes will be less
in economies with greater frictions.
It is also of interest to ask how individual employment dynamics change as we change
taxes, and how these changes are a®ected by the level of frictions. Table 4 shows the combi-
nations of average employment and nonemployment durations for each of the economies as
we change taxes.
The table shows that all of the adjustment takes place along the employment duration
margin. As was true in the calibrated economies, nonemployment durations are completely
dictated by the arrival rate of employment opportunities, and in all cases a worker who has
been nonemployed for at least one period will always work if presented with the opportunity.
26¿ = 0:00 ¿ = 0:15 ¿ = 0:30 ¿ = 0:45
¸w = 1:0 15:4=1:0 4:0=1:0 1:9=1:0 1:1=1:0
¸w = 0:3 40:6=3:3 13:1=3:3 6:4=3:3 3:6=3:3
¸w = 0:2 49:7=5:0 20:0=5:0 9:6=5:0 5:3=5:0
¸w = 0:1 55:5=10:0 38:1=10:0 19:1=10:0 10:7=10:0
Table 4: Average duration of employment/nonemployment
6 Conclusion
This paper analyzes a model that features frictions, an operative labor supply margin, and
incomplete markets. While much has been learned about models with frictions that do not
feature an operative labor supply margin as well as about models that feature operative labor
supply but no frictions, little is known about models with both features. We have argued that
an important goal is to determine for which issues these various features are quantitatively
important. The analysis carried out here is only a ¯rst step. In particular, we have only con-
sidered a model with homogeneous individuals, and the only experiments that we considered
were permanent changes in the size of tax and transfer systems. Nonetheless, we feel that
the analysis has provided several important ¯ndings. For example, there is substantial scope
for substitution between voluntary and frictional nonemployment in our model. This creates
the possibility that incorporating frictions into the analysis may have little or no impact on
the aggregate e®ects of some policies. If employment is close to the maximal amount allowed
given the extent of frictions, then incorporating frictions does a®ect the aggregate response of
the economy to changes in policy. In particular, the e®ects on aggregate employment will be
diminished. The e®ect of frictions was found to be highly non-linear, suggesting that one can-
not determine whether frictions are important without consideration of what type of policy
change is being considered, and what the initial equilibrium is. We also found that caution
must be used in interpreting job acceptance decisions to infer the relevance of labor supply
considerations. In our calibrated economies, all individuals who have been unemployed for at
least one period will accept any opportunity to work, but aggregate employment is far from
27the level that would result if labor supply considerations were not relevant and employment
were dictated only by frictions.
The model we develop can also be used for addressing other questions; more generally,
it is a good vehicle for gauging to what extent frictions and/or labor supply considerations
matter quantitatively for the answers. Already in the present setting, one could perform
other comparative statics exercises. As for the case of the policy change we considered
here, due to the nonlinearity of the model, some of these questions may have quite di®erent
answers depending on the exact details of the experiments. For other issues, such as for
example the analysis of how average hours worked are in°uenced by a permanent increase in
productivity, we suspect that the answer does not depend on the degree of frictions; for this
question, whether there are frictions or not, we expect very small e®ects under the preference
speci¯cation adopted here, since substitution and income e®ects cancel each other out.
Of particular interest here is the extent to which adding frictions to the indivisible labor
model might mute the size of employment °uctuations in response to productivity shocks.
Additionally, the nature of employment histories at the individual level may be very di®erent,
so that incorporating frictions and incomplete markets might provide a consistent framework
in which we understand a larger set of observations. For example, the indivisible labor model
without frictions might not do a good job of accounting for the patterns we see in individual
employment histories, and adding frictions may help in this dimension. The framework might
also have very interesting implications in the context of heterogeneous agents. We o®er one
example here in the context of business cycles. Shimer (2005) argues that layo® rates cannot
drive cyclical employment rate °uctuations because they produce an inconsistency with the
Beveridge curve. But if one considers a more general model it may be that layo®s are the
dominant source of °uctuations for some groups while labor supply considerations are the
dominant source of °uctuations for other groups, and that by combining these the aggregate
Beveridge curve is well behaved. Loosely speaking, one might imagine that for many prime
aged workers it is the increase in layo® rates coupled with search frictions that accounts
28for much of their cyclical °uctuations in employment, while for younger and less attached
workers layo®s play very little role.
29Appendix
Proposition 1 In the steady-state equilibrium, a worker's decision rules on asset accumu-
lation and the work-leisure choice are summarized by the following ¯ve cases, based on the
level of the current asset a. Let I be indicator function which takes 1 when working and 0
when not working.





a + (1 ¡ ¿)w + T;
and
I = 1:

































































Here, the thresholds on a are de¯ned as the following.
a =




¯((1 ¡ ¿)w ¡ DT)
(1 ¡ ¯)D
;
a¤ = a + ¯(1 ¡ ¿)w;
and
a¤ = ¹ a ¡ ¯(1 ¡ ¿)w:
Note that ¹ a ¡ a = ¯(1 ¡ ¿)w=(1 ¡ ¯). Also note that ¹ a > a¤ > a¤ > a holds.
31Proof: We proceed by the \guess and verify" method. It turns out that the borrowing
constraint will not be binding (it can be veri¯ed easily from the solution), so we ignore the
constraint in the following. First, guess that the value function takes the form described
in the text. To verify, we need to solve the problem with the above value function at the
right-hand side (RHS) and see if we get the decision rules above and V (a) at the left-hand
side (LHS).
Note that the value function is (weakly) concave, so the two maximization problems
inside are each concave programming problem. So we can solve each optimization problem
(for working and not working) one by one using the ¯rst-order conditions, and compare the
values. Details are ¯lled in later.
² Case 1: When a · a:
{ First optimization (working): From the ¯rst-order condition (FOC), a0 = a follows.
Therefore, from the budget constraint, c =
1¡¯
¯ a + (1 ¡ ¿)w + T follows. Thus,




¯ a + (1 ¡ ¿)w + T
´










{ Second optimization (not working): From the FOC, a0 = a ¡ ¯(1 ¡ ¿)w follows.
Thus, c =
1¡¯












One can show (see the details later) that for a 2 [0;a], it is always the case that
W(a;1) > W(a;0).
² Case 2: When a 2 (a;a¤):





















¯D((1 ¡ ¿)w + T) + (1 ¡ ¯)Da
¯(1 ¡ ¿)w(1 ¡ ¯)
:
{ Second optimization (not working): From the FOC, a0 = a ¡ ¯((1 ¡ ¿)w) follows.
Thus, c =
1¡¯
¯ a+¯w. Thus, c =
1¡¯













One can show (see the details later) that for a 2 (a;a¤), it is always the case that
W(a;1) > W(a;0).
² Case 3: When a 2 [a¤;a¤]:





















¯D((1 ¡ ¿)w + T) + (1 ¡ ¯)Da
¯(1 ¡ ¿)w(1 ¡ ¯)
:





















¯D((1 ¡ ¿)w + T) + (1 ¡ ¯)Da
¯(1 ¡ ¿)w(1 ¡ ¯)
:
Thus, W(a;1) = W(a;0) and the agent is indi®erent.
² Case 4: When a 2 (a¤;¹ a):
{ First optimization (working): From the FOC, a0 = a ¡ ¯(1 ¡ ¿)w follows. Thus,
c =
1¡¯

































¯D((1 ¡ ¿)w + T) + (1 ¡ ¯)Da
¯(1 ¡ ¿)w(1 ¡ ¯)
:
One can show (see the details later) that for a 2 (a¤;¹ a), it is always the case that
W(a;0) > W(a;1).
² Case 5: When a ¸ ¹ a:
{ First optimization (working): From the FOC, a0 = a¡¯((1¡¿)w) follows. Thus,
c =
1¡¯












34{ Second optimization (not working): From FOC, a0 = a. Therefore, from the
budget constraint, c =
1¡¯




¯ a + T
´










One can show (see the details later) that for a 2 [¹ a;1), it is always the case that
W(a;0) > W(a;1).
This completes the proof.
Details: Here, we ¯ll in the details of the proof. In particular, we check two things for each
case (except for the obvious ones).
1. That we are taking FOC at the right region of V (a0) in each optimization for a0.
2. The work/leisure inequality.
In the following, we will check them one by one.
² Case 1: Clearly, the FOCs (both working and not working) are taken at the ¯rst region











¯ a + ¯(1 ¡ ¿)w + T
´




¯ a + (1 ¡ ¿)w + T
1¡¯
¯ a + ¯(1 ¡ ¿)w + T
!
> (1 ¡ ¯)D:
Since the LHS is decreasing in a, it is su±cient to show that this holds when a = a.
Using the expression of a and rearranging, the inequality we need to show becomes
¡log(1 ¡ (1 ¡ ¯)D) > (1 ¡ ¯)D:
Since ¡log(1 ¡ x) > x for any x > 0, the result follows.
35² Case 2: First check the FOCs for each optimization.
First optimization: To show: a0 is in [a;¹ a]. This can be checked by the expression of a
and the fact a 2 (a;a¤). It turns out (with some algebra) that a 2 (a;a¤) corresponds
to a0 2 (a;a + (1 ¡ ¿)w). Since ¯ > 1=2, ¯((1 ¡ ¿)w)=(1 ¡ ¯) > (1 ¡ ¿)w. Thus,
a + (1 ¡ ¿)w < a + ¯(1 ¡ ¿)w=(1 ¡ ¯) = ¹ a.
Second optimization: a0 < a can easily be seen from the expression of a0.












¯ a + ¯(1 ¡ ¿)w + T
´
¡ (1 ¡ ¯)d(0) ¡ ¯d(1):
That is,















Both sides are equal when a = a¤. Thus, to show the claim, we only need to show
that the slope of the RHS, as a function of a, is larger than the slope of the LHS for
a 2 (a;a¤). The slope of the LHS is
(1 ¡ ¯)D
¯(1 ¡ ¿)w















D¯(1 ¡ ¿)w + DT
(1 ¡ ¿)w
:
For a 2 (a;a¤), f(a) 2 (1 ¡ D(1 ¡ ¯);1). Thus the slope of the RHS is always larger.
² Case 3: We only need to check that we are in the right region in the optimizations.
First optimization: Check that a0 2 [a;¹ a]. From the expression on a0 and a0 2 [a¤;a¤],
a0 2 [a + (1 ¡ ¿)w;¹ a] follows.
Second optimization: Check that a0 2 [a;¹ a]. From the expression on a0 and a0 2 [a¤;a¤],
a0 2 [a;¹ a ¡ (1 ¡ ¿)w] follows.
36² Case 4: First, check the FOCs.
First optimization: a0 ¸ ¹ a can easily be seen from the expression of a0.
Second optimization: To show: a0 2 (a;¹ a). This can be checked by the expression of
a and the fact a 2 (a¤;¹ a). It turns out (by some algebra) that a 2 (a¤;¹ a) corresponds
to a0 2 (¹ a ¡ ((1 ¡ ¿)w);¹ a). Since ¯ > 1=2, ¯((1 ¡ ¿)w)=(1 ¡ ¯) > (1 ¡ ¿)w. Thus,
¹ a ¡ ((1 ¡ ¿)w) > ¹ a ¡ ¯((1 ¡ ¿)w)=(1 ¡ ¯) = a.












¯ a + (1 ¡ ¯)(1 ¡ ¿)w + T
´
¡ (1 ¡ ¯)d(1) ¡ ¯d(0):
That is,














Both sides are equal when a = a¤. Thus, to show the claim, we only need to show
that the slope of the RHS, as a function of a, is smaller than the slope of the LHS for
a 2 (a¤;¹ a). The slope of the LHS is
(1 ¡ ¯)D
¯(1 ¡ ¿)w


















For a 2 (a¤;¹ a), g(a) 2 (1;1 + D(1 ¡ ¯)). Thus the slope of the RHS is always smaller.
² Case 5: Clearly, the FOCs (both working and not working) are taken at the third region











¯ a + (1 ¡ ¯)(1 ¡ ¿)w + T
´




¯ a + T
1¡¯
¯ a + (1 ¡ ¯)(1 ¡ ¿)w + T
!
> ¡(1 ¡ ¯)D:
Since the LHS is increasing in a, it is su±cient to show that this holds when a = ¹ a.
Using the expression of ¹ a and rearranging, the inequality we need to show becomes
¡log(1 + (1 ¡ ¯)D) > ¡(1 ¡ ¯)D:
Since ¡log(1 + x) > ¡x for any x > 0, the result follows. ¥
Proposition 2 Consider a complete-markets version of our model where an employment
lottery is available. The aggregate values of K and H, are identical between this complete-
markets model and the incomplete-markets model in which all individuals have assets in the
indi®erence region.
Proof: We start by characterizing equilibrium for the incomplete markets economy. In equi-
librium, K is equal to the sum of the individual asset holdings a and H is equal to the mass












hold. From the worker's Euler equation,
1
¯











K + w(1 ¡ ¿)H + T ¡ C: (2)
Given that the government balances its budget each period, we have ¿wH = T.
38Further, assume that this economy has workers only in the (a;¹ a) region. Then, everyone
















holds. We can obtain K and H by solving (1) and (3). T can then be calculated as T = ¿wH.
When an employment lottery is available in a complete-market setting, in the steady state
a worker solves the following problem:




(1 + r ¡ ±)a + ¸(1 ¡ ¿)w + T ¡ a0¢
¡ ¸d(1) ¡ (1 ¡ ¸)d(0) + ¯V (a0);
where ¸ is the employment probability. The ¯rst-order condition for the asset choice yields
1
c
= ¯(1 + r ¡ ±)
1
c0;
so again, in steady-state, 1=¯ = (1+r ¡±) has to hold. Since the ¯rm's ¯rst-order condition
is identical to the incomplete-market case, equation (1) has to hold in this model.
Note that ¸ = H in equilibrium. Summing up the budget constraint in this economy










Note that this is identical to the incomplete-market case. Thus, the equation (3) holds in the
complete-market economy. Since K and H solve (1) and (3) in both economies, the solution
has to be identical. ¥
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